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Forensic Science:
Chain of Custody
Paul Giannelli*

Condition of Evidence

Authentication or identification
of real evidence 1 refers to the requirement that an item of evidence
be proved to be genuine, that is, that
it is what its proponent claims it to
be. McCormick expressed the requirement this way: "[W]hen real
evidence is offered an adequate
foundation for admission will require testimony first that the object
offered is the object which was involved in the incident, and further
that the condition of the object is
substantially unchanged." 2 Federal
Evidence Rule 901(a) codifies this
requirement. 3

As the passage from McCormick
indicates, sometimes the condition
of an object is as important as its
identity. Alteration of the item may
reduce or negate its probative value
and may mislead the jury. Thus, before physical objects are admissible
in evidence the proponent must establish that they are in "substantially
the same condition as when the
crime was committed."4
Determining what changes are
"substantial" depends on how the
changes affect the relevance of the
evidence: "It should, however, always be borne in mind that foundational requirements are essentially
requirements of logic, and not rules
of art. Thus, for example, even a
radically altered item of real evidence may be admissible if its pertinent features remain unaltered." 5
For example, in United States v.
Skelley 6 counterfeit bills were admissible even though they apparently changed color because of tests

*Albert J. Weatherhead ill & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University. This
column is based in part on P. Giannelli
& E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence
(2d ed. 1993). Reprinted with permission.
1
The term "real evidence" is used to
describe tangible evidence that is historically connected with a criminal case,
as distinguished from evidence, such as
a model, that is merely illustrative.
2
2 McCormick, Evidence§ 212, at
8 (4th ed. 1992).
3
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) ("The requirement of authentication or identification
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.").

4
Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d
914,917 (9th Cir. 1960). Accord United
States v. Zink, 612 F2d 511, 514 (1Oth
Cir. 1980) ("condition is materially unchanged").
5 2 McCormick at 8-9.
6 501 F2d 447 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 us 1051 (1974).
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for fingerprints. According to the
court, the change in color did not
"destroy the relevance of the bills
to show their counterfeit character
from the identity of serial numbers,
and their competence as evidence
for this purpose [was] unimpaired by
the . . . possibility of a change in
color." 7

fying characteristics, such as a
number or mark, or are made to
have such identifying characteristics by special marks. 9
The Federal Rules recognize this
method of identification. Rule
901(b)(4), entitled "Distinctive characteristics and the like," provides
that "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics, taken in
conjunction with circumstances"
may satisfy the authentication requirement. 10 This method of proof
is merely an application of the firsthand knowledge 11 and opinion
rules 12-the opinion of a lay witness
based on personal observation.
Numerous examples of authenticating readily identifiable objects
are found in the cases. All of these
examples involve objects whose
characteristics somehow make them
umque.

Identity of Evidence
In criminal trials, it is often necessary to show that the item seized,
such as drugs, was the same item
analyzed at the crime laboratory and
introduced at trial. There are two
principal methods of proving the
identity of real evidence: first, establishing that the evidence is
"readily identifiable," and second,
establishing a "chain of custody."

Readily Identifiable Evidence
If an object is easily identified,
"unique and readily identifiable", 8
there may be no need to establish a
chain of custody. As one court has
noted:

Serial Numbers
Any item imprinted with a serial
number, such as a weapon 13 or dol-

If an exhibit is directly identified
by a witness as the object which
is involved in the case, then that
direct identification is sufficient.
Such is the case with many objects which have special identi-

9

State v. Conley, 288 NE2d 296, 300
(Ohio App. 1971). See also United
States v. LePera, 443 F2d 810, 813 (9th
Cir.) ("Counterfeit notes ... printed
from a single plate, are unique and identifiable without proof of chain of custody"), cert. denied, 404 US 958 (1971).
10
See United States v. Clonts, 966
F2d 1366, 1368 (lOth Cir. 1992) ("If the
evidence is unique, readily identifiable
and resistant to change, the foundation
for admission need only be testimony
that the evidence is what it purports to
be.").
11
Fed. R. Evid. 602.
12
Fed. R. Evid. 701.
13
E.g., United States v. Douglas, 964
F2d 738, 742 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Smith
and Wesson with serial number

7

Id. at 451. See also Duke v. State,
58 So. 2d 764, 769 (Ala. 1952) (shell
admissible although sheriff scratched
initials on it); Davidson v. State, 69
SE2d 757, 759 (Ga. 1952) (victim's
clothing admissible although washed);
Bruce v. State, 375 NE2d 1042, 1073
(Ind. 1978) (contamination "in no way
vitiated the evidentiary value of the exhibits").
8
2 McCormick at 8.
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lar bill, 14 may be identified by that
number.

ted into evidence, at least in part, on
this basis.

Police Markings

Natural Marks

An object that is inscribed with
the initials or markings of a police
officer or other person may be
readily identifiable. In such cases,
the person converts a nonunique
object into a readily identifiable one
by placing distinctive markings on
it. This practice, recommended in
crime scene and evidence collection
manuals, 15 is well accepted in the
cases. Firearms, 16 bullets, 17 currency, 18 laboratory slides, 19 and sundry other objects 20 have been admit-

An object may possess distinctive
natural characteristics that may
make it readily identifiable.Z 1 For
example, in United States v. Logan 22
a "gun-the only .25 Titan automatic with a scratched-off serial
number that Officer Grimes had ever
seized-was admitted into evidence
only after Officer Grimes identified
it by make, model, size, color, style
of its grip, and its scratched-off serial number. We find the government
made a prima facie showing of authenticity. " 23
In United States v. Briddle 24 the
prosecution introduced evidence
that a button top found at the scene
of a burglary came from the
defendant's coat. The police officer
described the button as follows:

79515"); State v. Kroeplin, 266 NW2d
537, 540 (N.D. 1978).
14
E.g., Calderon v. United States,
269 F2d 416,419 (lOth Cir. 1959); State
v. Conley, 288 NE2d 296, 300-301
(OhioApp. 1971).
15 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Handbook of Forensic Science 113
(rev. ed. 1994).
16
E.g., United States v. Madril, 445
F2d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 1971) (pistol),
vacated on other grounds, 404 US 1010
(1972); Lilly v. State, 482 NE2d 457,
459 (Ind. 1985).
17 E.g., Sims v. State, 252 SE2d 501,
503 (Ga. 1979); State v. Ross, 169 SE2d
875, 878 (NC 1969), cert. denied, 397
US 1050 (1970). See also Almodovar
v. State, 464 NE2d 906, 911 (Ind. 1984)
(initials scratched on shell casing).
18 E.g., United States v. Capocci, 433
F2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 1970) (counterfeit bill); United States v. Bourassa, 411
F2d 69, 72-73 (lOth Cir.) (coin), cert.
denied, 396 US 915 (1969).
19 E.g., Gass v. United States, 416
F2d 767,770 (DC Cir. 1969); Wheeler
v. United States, 211 F2d 19,22-23 (DC
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 US 1019
(1954).
20
E.g., 0' Quinn v. United States, 411
F2d 78,80 (lOth Cir. 1969) Gar); People

It had a picture of a whale on the
front of it. It was leather.... And

v. Horace, 9 Cal. Rptr. 43, 44 (App.
1960) (crowbar); State v. Engberg, 708
P2d 935, 939 (Idaho App. 1985) (seizing officer placed initials on poker machine); People v. Sansone, 356 NE2d
101,103 (Ill.App.l976)(stolenrecord
albums); Johnson v. State, 370 NE2d
892, 894-895 (Ind. 1977) (knife); State
v. Coleman, 441 SW2d 46, 51 (Mo.
1969) (box, watch, and bolt).
21
E.g., United States v. Reed, 392
F2d 865, 867 (7th Cir.) ("very unusual
looking hat"), cert. denied, 393 US 984
(1968); Reyes v. United States, 383 F2d,
734, 734 (9th Cir. 1967) (holdup note
"was unique and readily identifiable").
22 949 F2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 US 925 (1992).
23
Id. at 1378.
24 443 F2d 443 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US 942 (1971).
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it had a sticky substance on the
back, as though it might have
been stuck to something .... [I]t
was a dark brown in color. Had a
whale or fish on it. The tail was
up in the air. Split. And I believe
it was the left eye of the animal
that was up. 25

assault. Papse's ability or inability to specify particular identifying features of the ax, as well as
the evidence of the ax's alleged
changed condition, should then
go to the question of weight to be
accorded this evidence, which is
precisely what the trial court
ruled. In other words, although
the jury remained free to reject the
government's assertion that this
ax had been used in the assault,
the requirements for admissibility specified in Rule 901(a) had
been met. 28

The Eighth Circuit held this identification sufficient: "Given the
uniqueness of the buttons on
Briddle's coat, we think this identification evidence established that the
exhibit ... was the button top found
at the scene of the burglary." 26 Thus,
the issue is whether the distinctive
characteristics are sufficient to make
it unlikely that another object would
have the same characteristics. 27

Chain of Custody
The use of a chain of custody to
authenticate evidence is well established. Nevertheless, two commentators have written that the governing federal rule "can easily be read
as doing away with any chain of
custody requirement;" 29 This seems
unwise. If anything, there is a need
for more stringent requirements. The
mass processing of immunoassay
tests and the increasing volume of
DNA testing heightens the importance of proper handling procedures.
Indeed, improper labeling has been
found to be the cause of an error in
a DNA proficiency test. 30

Witness :S Uncertainty
A witness's uncertainty in identifying an exhibit, however, affects
the weight, not the admissibility, of
the evidence. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has written:
[A]lthough the trial record reveals
the identification of the ax made
by Papse may not have been entirely free from doubt, the witness
did state that he was "pretty sure"
this was the weapon Johnson had
used against him, that he saw the
ax in Johnson's hand, and that he
was personally familiar with this
particular ax because he had used
it in the past. Based on Papse's
testimony, a reasonable juror
could have found that his ax was
the weapon allegedly used in the

United States v.Johnson, 637 F2d
1224, 1247-1248 (9th Cir. 1980). Accord United States v. Drumright, 534
F2d 1383, 1385 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied,
429 US 960 (1976); United States v.
Capocci, 433 F2d 155, 157 (1st Cir.
1970); United States v. Rizzo, 418 F2d
71, 81 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
us 967 (1970).
29
2 Saltzburg & Martin, Federal
Rules of Evidence Manual478 (5th ed.
1990) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)).
28

25

Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
27
See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 411
(Chadbourn rev. 1979).
26
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Need for Chain of Custody

evidence readily identifiable and
eliminates most problems of misidentification and contamination.34

In some situations the proponent
must establish a chain of custody.
Such proof may be necessary either
because the item of evidence is not
readily identifiable, or because more
than simple identification is necessary to establish the item's relevance.

Lab Analysis
If the relevance of an exhibit depends on its subsequent laboratory
analysis, identification by police
markings made at the scene does not
provide a sufficient foundation. The
markings establish that the exhibit
in court was the item seized by the
police, but a chain of custody may
be necessary to establish that the
item seized was the item analyzed
at the crime laboratory. For example,
in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 35 the
court reversed a rape conviction due
to a break in the chain of custody:
"The mere fact that the blouse and
the panties were identified (by the
victim at trial] did not prove the
chain of possession necessary to validate the F.B.I. analysis of them. " 36

Fungible Items
A chain of custody is often required for fungible evidence because
these items have no unique characteristics. The inability to distinguish
between fungible items makes positive identification by observation
alone impossible. 31 In addition, the
nature of these items frequently
makes them particularly susceptible
to tampering or loss. 32 Nevertheless,
the proper handling of fungible evidence-using lock-sealed envelopes33 or containers that custodians
then mark and initial-makes the

Condition

30 Thompson, "The Myth of DNA
Fingerprints," 9 Cal. Law. 34 (Apr.
1989) (Cellmark official admitted that
the "error occurred because a lab technician incorrectly labeled a vial.").
31 See State v. Conley, 288 NE2d
296,300 (OhioApp. 1971) ("One white
pill looks much like any other white pill
and hence positive identification simply by observation is usually impossible.").
32 The "danger of tampering, loss, or
mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest where the exhibit is small and
is one which has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in
form to substances familiar to people
in their daily lives." Graham v. State,
255 NE2d 652, 655 (Ind. 1970).
33 Lock-sealed envelopes "can be
opened only by destroying the seals."
United States v. Santiago, 534 F2d 768,
770 (7th Cir. 1976).

If the condition of the object, not
merely its identity, is the relevant
34 See United States v. Pressly, 978
F2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The
officer who seized the substances [cocaine] testified that he marked them at
the time of the seizure and that the packages admitted into evidence still bore
his marks."); People v. Rivera, 592
NYS2d 697 (App. Div. 1993) (failure
of arresting officer to mark six fungible
glassine envelopes of heroin at time of
seizure resulted in a gap in the chain of
custody that required a reversal).
35 183 SE2d 179 (Va. 1971).
36 Id. at 181. See also Graham v.
State, 255 NE2d 652, 655-656 (Ind.
1970) (wrapper containing white powder was initialed at time police took
possession but break in chain of custody prior to chemical analysis resulted
in reversal).
451
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issue, a chain of custody may be required to establish that the object
was not altered during police custody. This requirement is a necessary safeguard for evidence that is
susceptible to undetected contamination or deterioration, such as blood
samples37 and substances subjected to
neutron activation analysis.38

Length of Chain
When a chain of custody is required, either to show the identity
of the item or its unchanged condition, it is necessary to determine
where the chain begins and ends.
Only breaks in possession that occur within the period included in the
chain of custody affect admissibility.

37
See Ritter v. State, 462 SW2d 247,
249 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) ("Blood
specimens ... should be handled with
the greatest of care and all persons who
handle the specimen should be ready to
identify it and testify to its custody and
unchanged condition"). See also
Glendening &Waugh, "The Stability of
Ordinary Blood Alcohol Samples Held
Various Periods of Time Under Different Conditions," 10 J. Forensic Sci. 192,
199 (1965) (showing instability of alcohol content in blood samples for different temperatures and storage periods).
38
See Comment, "The Evidentiary
Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis,"
59 Cal. L. Rev. 997, 1013 (1971) ("If
two unknowns that are compared to
determine whether they came from a
common source have both been contaminated in a similar way, it is clear
that completely false points of similarity can result"); State v. Johnson, 539
SW2d 493, 505 (Mo. App. 1976) (control sample used to establish that Neutron Activation Analysis sample was
uncontaminated), cert. denied, 430 US
934 (1977).

Initial Link
Disputes over the initial link in
the chain of custody focus on
whether the continuous possession
requirement should apply at the time
of the incident at issue or at the time
when the evidence comes into possession of its proponent. According
to one position, a "chain-of-custody
foundation is not required ... for
periods before the evidence comes
into the possession of law enforcement personnel." 39 The theory underlying this rule is that "the State
cannot be charged with the responsibility of accounting for the custody
of the exhibit" when it is not in its
possession. 40 This rule has been applied in two different types of cases:
first, those in which a third party had
possession of the object prior to the
time it was turned over to the police,41 and second, those in which the
object was not discovered at the
crime scene until sometime after the
commission of the crime. 42
This position misconceives the
purpose of the chain of custody rule.
The rule is not designed to hold the
police accountable, but rather to ensure that evidence is relevant. Police accountability is a means to this
end. If the relevance of an object
depends on its use in a crime, the
39
Williams v. State, 379 NE2d 981,
984 (Ind. 1978).
40
Zupp v. State, 283 NE2d 540, 543
(Ind. 1972).
41 E.g., Zupp v. State, 283 NE2d 540,
543 (Ind. 1972); Love v. State, 383
NE2d 382, 384 (Ind. App. 1978).
42
See Williams v. State, 379 NE2d
981, 984 (Ind. 1978) (three-hour delay
in discovery of revolver); Thornton v.
State, 376 NE2d 492, 494 (Ind. 1978)
(knife discovered in open field subsequent to arrest).
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time of trial in all cases. 45 There may
be some support for this view in the
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 901, where the drafters
refer to "establishing narcotics as
taken from an accused and accounting for custody through the period
until trial, including laboratory
analysis." 46
The "length" of the chain of custody, however, depends on the purpose for which the evidence is offered. This point is illustrated by
State v. Conley, 47 which involved a
prosecution for the illegal sale of
LSD. The drugs were purchased
with marked bills whose serial numbers had been recorded. The defendant objected to both the admissibility of the bills and the LSD. The
court wrote:

offering party must establish,
through a chain of custody or otherwise, a connection between that object and the crime. 43 For example, if
a third party finds a rifle near a crime
scene and turns it over to the police
several hours or days after the crime,
it would be necessary to "account"
for the rifle during the time it was in
the third party's possession in order
to tie the rifle to the place where the
crime occurred. 44

Final Link
Disagreement over the point at
which the chain of custody ends focuses on whether the chain ends
when the item is introduced at trial
or at an earlier stage, for example,
when a laboratory analyzes the item.
Some commentators have read several cases as requiring the prosecution to trace the chain of custody
from the time of seizure until the

To identify a particular item ...
as being part of a pe1tinent incident in the past usually requires
the showing of a continuous chain
of custodians up to the material
moment. When a chemical analysis is involved ... the material
moment is the moment of analysis, since this provides the basis
for the expert testimony and
makes that testimony relevant to
the case. In the case of many other
items, the material moment occurs at the trial. 48

43
In United States v. White, 569 F2d
263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 848
(1978), the court noted: "This is not a
routine chain of custody situation in
which the chain is broken between seizure of the evidence from the accused
and a subsequent trial. Rather, the alleged break occurred before the government came into possession of the
heroin." Id. at 266. After citing the rule
in the "typical chain of custody cases,"
the court wrote: "We apply the same
rule in the instant case." Id.
44 See United States v. Gelzer, 50 F3d
1133, 1141 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The government concedes that there was not a
'full' chain of custody established for
the revolver alleged to have been used
during the robberies and to have been
discarded during the car chase. At trial,
Officer Staub testified that he found the
revolver on Scranton Avenue near the
intersection of Picadilly Downs and
gave it to Officer Curtis.") (evidence
admitted).

45
See Annotation, "Proof of identity
of person or thing where object, specimen, or part is taken from a human
body, as basis for admission of testimony or report of expert or officer based
on such object, specimen, or part," 21
ALR2d 1216, 1236 (1952).
46
Fed. R. Evid. 901, advisory committee note.
47 288 NE2d 296 (Ohio App. 1971).
48
Id. at 300.
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The court went on to hold that the
chain of custody for the marked bills
ran from the time the bills were
marked until the trial, at which time
they were identified. The chain of
custody for the drugs differed; it ran
from the time of seizure to the time
of chemical analysis. 49
As a matter of relevance, this approach is sound. The loss or destruction of the drugs after chemical
analysis would not affect the relevance of the expert's testimony
concerning the nature of the drugs. 50
Moreover, the prosecution generally
is not required to introduce real evidence to prove its case:

The so-called "best evidence" rule
applies only to writings, recordings,
and photographs, not to real evidence.52
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted a contrary
position. According to the court,
"when a defendant is charged with
possession of a controlled substance,
that substance, if available, must be
introduced into evidence."53 In support of this rule, the court wrote:
An absolute rule that a substance
may be introduced or not at the
discretion of the prosecutor is
·practically undesirable because of
its potential for abuse. For example, such prosecutorial discretion could deliberately or unwittingly be used to confuse defense
counsel and thwart the ability to
make certain objections, particularly objections to chain of
custody....
The state's failure to introduce
the substance in evidence against
the defendant might put the defendant in the awkward position
of introducing it himself should
he wish to challenge its authenticity where there has been testimony
of its existence as here .... 54

It is not always necessary that tangible evidence be physically admitted at a trial. ... Even when
evidence is available it need not
be physically offered. Thus, the
grand larceny of an automobile
may be established merely on
competent testimony describing
the stolen vehicle without actually producing the automobile
before the trier of fact.s'
49
See United States v. Grant, 967
F2d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In order for
the chemist's testimony to be relevant,
there must be some likelihood that the
substance tested by the chemist was the
substance seized at the airport."), cert.
denied, 507 US 924 (1993).
50
See United States v. Bailey, 277
F2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1960) ("Even if
the exhibits, including the heroin, had
not been introduced in evidence the testimony of the witnesses and the stipulation as to the chemical analysis were
sufficient. ... "); United States v. Sears,
248 F2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 US 602 (1958).
51
Holle v. State, 337 A2d 163, 166
(Md. App. 1975) (stolen marked currency). Accord United States v. Kelly,
14F3d 1169, 1176(7thCir.l994)("The

In addition, the loss or destruction
of the evidence after laboratory

government is not required to introduce
narcotics in evidence to obtain a narcotics conviction."); United States v.
Figueroa, 618 F2d 934, 941 (2d Cir.
1980) (heroin); Chandler v. United
States, 318 F2d 356, 357 (lOth Cir.
1963) (whiskey bottles).
52
See Fed. R. Evict. 1002.
53
G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975,
977 (Fla. 1982).
54 Id. at 977-998.
454
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analysis may affect the defendant's
right to reexamine the evidence,
which could result in the exclusion
of expert testimony based on the
prior laboratory examination. 55

courts have indicated that all the
links in the chain of custody must
testify at triaJ.5 8 The prevalent view,
however, is that "the fact of a 'missing link does not prevent the admission of real evidence, so long as
there is sufficient proof that the evidence is what it purports to be.' " 59
Thus, while a custodian in the chain
of possession need not testify under
all circumstances, the evidence
should be accounted for during the
time it was under that custodian's
control. Several recurrent examples
of "missing link" cases are discussed
in this article.

Links in Chain
The "links" in the chain of custody are those persons who have had
physical custody of the object. Persons who have had access to, but not
possession of, the evidence generally need not be accounted for. Such
persons are not custodians. As noted
by one court: "There is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce
as witnesses all persons who were
in a position to come into contact
with the article sought to be introduced in evidence. 56
Failure to account for the evidence during possession by a custodian may constitute a critical break
in the chain of custody. 57 Some

Infonnants
The authentication of evidence by
means other than the testimony of
custodial links frequently arises in
drug cases where an informant who
has handled the drugs does not testify at trial. In this situation, an undercover officer who had accompanied the informant can testify about
the informant's handling of the
drugs. Thus, a noncustodian with

55 See 1 Giannelli & Imwinkelried,
Scientific Evidence § 3-7 (2d ed. 1993)
(constitutional duty to preserve evidence).
56
Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d
914,917 (9th Cir. 1960).Accord United
States v. Fletcher, 487 F2d 22, 23 (5th
Cir. 1973) (fact that "fifteen persons had
access to the evidence room" affects
weight, not admissibility), cert. denied,
416 us 958 (1974).
57 E.g., United States v. Panczko, 353
F2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1965) ("There is
no evidence as to where or from whom
Lieutenant Rernkus got the keys"), cert.
denied, 383 US 935 (1966); Novak v.
District of Columbia, 160 F2d 588, 589
(DC Cir. 1947) (evidence failed "to
identify the sample from which the
analyses were made as being that
sample taken from the appellant");
Smith v. United States, 157 F2d 705
(DC Cir. 1946) (witness testified that
watch presented in court had been
handed to him by police officer at scene

but he did not see where officer obtained
watch); United States v. Lewis, 19 MJ
869 (AFCMR 1985) (prosecution failed
to show that urine sample analyzed at
lab was the sample taken from the defendant).
58 E.g., People v. Connelly, 316 NE2d
706, 708 (NY 1974) ("Admissibility
generally requires that all those who
have handled the item 'identify it and
testify to its custody and unchanged
condition'").
59 United States v. Howard-Arias,
679 F2d 363, 366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US 874 (1982). See also
United States v. Harrington, 923 F2d
1371, 1374 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he prosecution was not required to call the custodian of the evidence"), cert. denied, 502
us 852 (1991).
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upon the state." 63 Therefore, courts
invoke the presumption that "articles
transported by regular United States
mail and delivered in the ordinary
course of the mails are delivered in
substantially the same condition in
which they were sent."64
Many law enforcement agencies
recommend registered mail or other
similar means for sending evidence.65 Furthermore, the FBI recommends stringent packaging requirements for items mailed to its
laboratory. 66 Proof that these procedures were followed, and not the
presumption of due delivery, assures
the reliability of the evidence.

firsthand knowledge may supply
evidence of the object's handling
while in the custody of the nontestifying informant. 60
The testimony of a custodial link
also may be dispensed with when
circumstantial evidence sufficiently
connects a defendant with drugs
purchased from him by an informant, that is, a "controlled drug
buy." For example, in Peden v.
United States 61 an informant was
searched prior to a drug transaction
and provided with marked money.
While under surveillance, she met
the defendant, and both were immediately arrested and searched. The
informant had morphine and the defendant had the marked money. Although the informant did not testify,
the court held the chain sufficient to
connect the defendant to the morphine.62

Minor Links
Another category of cases involves what rriay be called "minor
links" -intermediate custodians
who have possession for a short period of time and merely passed the
evidence along to another link. For
example, in one case a chief chemist, who had received a sealed enve-

Postal Employees
Postal employees who handle
evidence sent to a crime laboratory
by mail are custodial links. Postal
employees rarely, if ever, testify at
trial, however. A rule requiring every custodian to testify would necessitate calling all postal employees
who handled the evidence. This
would "place an impossible burden

63
Trantham v. State, 508 P2d 1104,
1107 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
64
Schacht v. State, 50 NW2d 78, 80
(Neb. 1951). See also Pasadena Research Lab., Inc. v. United States, 169
F2d 375, 382 (9th Cir.) (presumption
of regularity applies to postal employees' handling of vials during shipment),
cert. denied, 335 US 853 (1948).
65
F.B.I., supra note 15 at 103 (citing
U.S. Postal Service, United Parcel Service, Federal Express). See also United
States v. Godoy, 528 F2d 281, 283 (9th
Cir. 1975) (narcotics sent by registered
mail to laboratory); United States v.
Jackson, 482 F2d, 1254, 1266 (8th Cir.
1973) (registered, special delivery, air
mail).
66 F.B.I., supra note 15 at 92 (use
suitable containers, package each item
separately, and seal securely).

60
E.g., United States v. Jones, 404
F. Supp. 529, 542 (ED Pa. 1975) (undercover agent observed defendant gi ving drugs to informant; informant did
not testify), aff'd, 538 F2d 321 (3d Cir.
1976).
61
223 F2d 319 (DC Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 359 US 971 (1959).
62
Id. at 321. See also United States
v. Amaro, 422 F2d 1078, I 080 (9th Cir.
1970).
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Burden and Standard of Proof

lope of heroin and then turned it over
to the examining chemist, did not
testify. The court upheld the
admisibility of the evidence because
the seal was "unbroken when the
latter received it. " 67 The category of
minor links whose testimony is not
required to establish a chain of custody includes not only laboratory
personnel, 68 but also police officers
who receive evidence from a seizing officer and mail 69 or transporC 0
it to a laboratory for analysis.
In short, "accounting for" all the
links in the chain of custody does
not necessarily mean all the links
need testify at trial.

The burden of proving the chain
of custody rests with the party offering the evidence. 71 Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the courts described the standard of proof in various ways. The
most common expression of the
standard was that the offering party
had to establish the identity and condition of the exhibit by a "reasonable probability."72 Phrases such as
"reasonable certainty"73 and "reasonable assurance" 74 seem only variants of this standard. The reasonable
probability standard appears to require no more than the "preponderance of evidence" or "more probable
than not" standard, 75 and some
70
E.g., United States v. Lampson,
627 F2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1980) (deputy
sheriff who transported evidence did not
testify); Bay v. State, 489 NE2d 1220,
1223 (Ind. App. 1986) (detective who
transported marijuana to lab did not testify).
71
See United States v. Santiago, 534
F2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1976); 1
Wigmore, Evidence§ 18, at 841 (Tillers
rev. 1983).
72
E.g., United States v. Brown, 482
F2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1973) ("reasonable probability the article has not
been changed in any important respect''); United States v. Capocci, 433
F2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 1970).
73 See United States v. Jones, 404 F.
Supp. 529,543 (ED Pa. 1975); Sorce v.
State, 497 P2d 902, 903 (Nev. 1972).
74
See State v. Cress, 344 A2d 57, 61
(Me. 1975); State v. Baines, 394 SW2d
312, 316 (Mo. 1965), cert. denied, 384
US 992 (1966); People v. Julian, 360
NE2d 1310, 1313 (NY 1977).
75
See People v. Riser, 305 P2d 1, 10
(Cal.) ("The requirement of reasonable
certainty is not met when some vital link
in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then it is as likely

67

United States v. Picard, 464 F2d
215,216 n.l (1st Cir. 1972).
68
E.g., United States v. Williams,
809 F2d 75, 89-90 (1st Cir. 1986) (lab
technician need not testify), cert. denied, 482 US 906 (1987); United States
v. Glaze, 643 F2d 549, 552 (8th Cir.
1981) (nontestifying chemist received
and transported narcotics to testifying
chemist).
69
E.g., United States v. Gelzer, 50
F3d 1133,1141 (2dCir.l995)("Attrial,
Officer Staub testified that he found the
revolver on Scranton Avenue ... and
gave it to Officer Curtis. Next, Postal
Inspector Morrison testified that he received the revolver from Detective
Curtis and sent it to Washington, D.C.,
for forensic testing."); United States v.
Jones, 404 F. Supp. 529, 543 (ED Pa.
1975) (testimony of officer who mailed
heroin to lab not necessary where sealed
packages initialed and return receipt
introduced), aff'd 538 F2d 321 (3d Cir.
1976); United States v. Marks, 32 F.
Supp. 459, 460 (D. Conn. 1940) (police officer who mailed heroin died prior
to trial; officer's handwriting on sealed
envelopes identified and package sent
by registered mail).
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courts have explicitly expressed the
standard in those terms. 76 This standard is the typical standard in evidence law- 77 Under this view, chain of
custody "requirements go to the competency of the evidence, not merely
to its credibility."78 Under this view,
the trial court determines whether this
standard has been satisfied.79

evidence; rather, the court decides
only whether sufficient evidence has
been introduced from which a reasonable jury could find the evidence
identified. 80 In other words, the offering party need only make a "prima
facie" 81 showing of authenticity to gain
admissibility, and the jury decides finally whether the evidence has been
sufficiently identified. 82
Not only is the prima facie standard less stringent than the "more
probable than not" standard, but it
also results in a different rule concerning the application of the rules
of evidence. Federal Rule 104(a)
provides that in deciding preliminary questions of admissibility the
trial court "is not bound by the rules
of evidence except those with respect to privileges." 83 Accordingly,

Federal Rules
In contrast, Federal Rule 90l(a)
requires only that the offering party
introduce "evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent
claims." Thus, the trial court does
not decide whether the item has been
identified by a preponderance of the
as not that the evidence analyzed was
not the evidence originally received"),
appeal dismissed, 358 US 646 (1959);
State v. Serl, 269 NW2d 785, 788-789
(SD 1978).
76 See State v. Henderson, 337 So.
2d 204, 206 (La. 1976); State v. Williams, 273 So. 2d 280, 281 (La. 1973)
("clear preponderance").
77 See Bourjaily v. United States,
483 US 171, 175 (1987) ("We have
traditionally required that these [preliminary] matters be established by a
preponderance of proof."). See also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; 113 S. Ct. 2786) (1993)
(preponderance of evidence standard
applies to the admissibility of expert
testimony under Fed. Evid. R.
104(a)).
78 State v. Serl, 269 NW2d 785, 789
(SD 1978).
79 "That determination is to be made
by the trial judge, not the jury. . . . "
United States v. Brown, 482 F2d 1226,
1228 (8th Cir. 1973). Accord United
States v. Daughtry, 502 F2d 1019,
1021-1023 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Stevenson, 445 F2d 25, 27 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US 857 (1971).

80

See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1190, 1219 (ED Pa. 1980)("The
Advisory Committee Note to Rule
104(b) makes plain that preliminary
questions of conditional relevancy are
not determined solely by the judge, for
to do so would greatly restrict the function of the jury.... "), rev'd on other
grounds, 723 F2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 475 US 574 (1986).
81
See United States v. Sparks, 2 F3d
574, 582 (5th Cir. 1993) (Prosecution
need only make a "prima facie" showing that bottles of crack seized from
accused were the drugs analyzed);
United States v. Ortiz, 966 F2d 707, 716
(1st Cir. 1992) (Rule 901(a) "does not
erect a particularly high hurdle.").
82
See United States v. Goichman,
547 F2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[I]t
is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence,
not the court.").
83
See also United States v. Matlock,
415 US 164, 172-173 (1974) ("[T]he
rules of evidence normally applicable
in criminal trials do not operate with full
force at hearings before the judge to
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if the admissibility decision is entrusted to the trial court under the
"more probable than not" standard,
evidence rules would not be applicable and hearsay could be considered by the court. Rule 104(b),
which governs questions of conditional relevancy, is an exception to
Rule 104(a). If Rule 104(b) controls,
the rules of evidence apply because
the jury must share in the authenticity decision:

away with any chain of custody requirement."85 Several decisions of
the Fifth Circuit contain language
that supports this view. For example,
the court has written that "chain of
custody goes to the weight rather
than the admissibility of the evidence, and is thus reserved for the
jury. " 86 The Second Circuit also appears to have adopted this less stringent standard: "Fed. R. Evid. 901
requires that to meet the admissibility threshold the government need
only prove a rational basis for concluding that an exhibit is what it is
claimed to be." 87
Other federal courts of appeal,
however, continue to apply the "reasonable probability" standard that
applied before the Federal Rules of
Evidence wereadopted. 88 Moreover,

[W]hile the court's power to
"consider" inadmissible evidence
under Rule 104(a) is clear, the
substantive determination which
the court is required to make on
the issue of authentication is
whether admissible evidence exists which is sufficient to support
a jury finding of authenticity....
[O]ur task in ruling on authenticity is limited to determining
whether there is substantial admissible evidence to support a
finding of authentication by the
trier of fact. 84

2 Saltzburg & Martin, Federal
Rules of Evidence Manual478 (5th ed.
1990). But see Analysis, Mil. R. Evid.
901 ("There appears to be no reason to
believe that the rule will change present
law as it affects chains of custody for
real evidence especially iffungible.").
86
Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656
F2d 1147, 1154(5thCir.198l).Accord
United States v. Johnson, 68 F3d 899,
903 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Any break in the
chain of custody affects the weight, not
the admissibility of evidence. Thus, if
the district court correctly finds that the
government has made a prima facie
showing of authenticity, then the evidence is admissible, and issues of authenticity are for the jury to decide.");
United States v. Shaw, 920 F2d 1225,
1229-1230 (5th Cir) ("any break in the
chain of custody of physical evidence
does not render the evidence inadmissible but instead goes to the weight that
the jury should accord that evidence."),
cert. denied, 500 US 926 (1991).
87 United States v. Hon, 904 F2d 803,
809 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 US
1069 (1991).
88
E.g., United States v. Williams, 44
F3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) ("reason85

Since the Federal Rules treat authentication as a matter of conditional
relevance, that is, they adopt the
prima facie evidence standard, evidence rules apply in this context.
Whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence were intended to effect a
major change in the chain of custody
requirements is unclear. Two commentators have written that "Rule
901(a) can easily be read as doing
determine the admissibility of evidence.").
84
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190,
1220 (ED Pa. 1980) (emphasis added),
rev' d on other grounds, 723 F2d 238
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'd 475 US 574
(1986).
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decisions of both the Fifth89 and Second Circuits 90 also cite the "reasonable
probability" standard as the threshold
requirement under Rule 901.
The standard on appeal for reviewing a trial court's decision on
identification is whether it is an
abuse of the court's discretion. 91

accident, carelessness, error or
fraud, or (B) testimony describing real evidence of the type set
forth in (A) if the information on
which the description is based
was acquired while the evidence
was in the custody or control of
the prosecution, the prosecution
must first demonstrate as a matter of reasonable certainty that the
evidence is at the time of trial or
was at the time it was observed
properly identified and free of the
possible taints identified by this
paragraph.
(2) In any case in which real
evidence of the kind described in
subparagraph (1) of this subdivision is offered, the court may require additional proof before deciding whether to admit or
exclude evidence under Rule 403.

State Rules
Some state adaptations of the
Federal Rules specifically require a
chain of custody. For example,
Alaska Rule 90l(a) provides:
(I) Whenever the prosecution
in a criminal trial offers (A) real
evidence which is of such a nature as not to be readily identifiable, or as to be susceptible to
adulteration, contamination,
modification, tampering, or other
changes in form attributable to

Application of the Standard of
Proof

able likelihood"); United States v.
Harrington, 923 F2d 1371, 1374 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 US 852 (1991);
United States v. Cardenas, 864 F2d
1528, 1532 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 491
US 909 (1989); United States v. Rans,
851 F2d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988).
89 See Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc.,
656 F2d 1147, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Albert, 595 F2d 283,
290 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 US 963
(1979).
90
United States v. Gelzer, 50 F3d
1133, 1141 (2d Cir. 1995) ("There was
sufficient evidence to establish that it
is more likely than not that the revolver
offered at trial was the same as that recovered by Officer Staub.").
91
E.g., United States v. Ladd, 885
F2d 954, 956 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Jones, 687 F2d 1265, 1267 (8th
Cir. 1982); United States v. HowardArias, 679 F2d 363, 366 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 US 874 (1982); United
States v. Mullins, 638 F2d 1151, 1152
(8th Cir. 1981).

To satisfy its burden of proof, the
prosecution need not eliminate every possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering. The "mere possibility of a break in the chain does
not render the physical evidence inadmissible, but raises the question
of weight to be accorded by the
jury." 92 Accordingly, discrepancies
concerning the weight, 93 number, 94

92
United States v. Jardina, 747 F2d
945, 951 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 us 1058 (1985).
93
See United States v. Godoy, 528
F2d 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1975); People v.
Zipprich, 490 NE2d 8, 10-11 (Ill. App.
1986).
94
See United States v. Hon, 904 F2d
803, 8 10 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 US 1069 (1991); United States v.
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date, 95 and labeling96 of evidence
often will not result in exclusion. In
one case a four-day delay, during
which drugs and a gun remained in
a police officer's car trunk, did not
result in exclusion of the evidence. 97
In another case, the court ruled that
"[a]lthough the chain of custody for
the bottles may not be perfect, we
conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting
this evidence." 98
In United States v. Ladd, 99 the
First Circuit stated the rule as follows:

sloppiness, regrettable in a forensic laboratory. Yet the net effect
of any such disarray on the authenticity of the evidence depended on what inferences a reasonable factfinder might choose
to draw from it. Where, as in this
case, a trier chooses among plausible (albeit competing) inferences, appellate courts should not
intrudeY)()
Accordingly, the evidence was admissible. The same court, however,
ruled that another item of evidence
should have been excluded due to a
"missing link" that resulted from a
discrepancy between laboratory
identification numbers: "In short,
there was no competent proof to indicate that the sample extracted from
Massey's corpse was the one which
CSL tested. An important step in the
custodial pavane was omitted." 101

In the last analysis, the prosecution's chain-of-custody evidence
must be adequate-not infallible.
Here, some links in the chain
were rusty, but none were missing. Without question, the defense
succeeded in showing a certain
Clark, 425 F2d 827, 833 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 US 820 (1970).
95
See United States v. Robinson, 967
F2d 287,291 (9th Cir. 1992) ("government concedes that there is a discrepancy regarding the date of seizure");
United States v. Barcella, 432 F2d 570,
572 (1st Cir. 1970).
96
See United States v. Kelly, 14 F3d
1169, 1175-1176 (7th Cir. 1994) (discrepancy in inventory did not preclude
admissibility of evidence); United
States v.Ailocco, 234 F2d 955,956 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 US 931 (1956);
Ingle v. State, 377 NE2d 885, 892 (Ind.
App. 1975); State v. Beaudoin, 386A2d
731, 733 (Me. 1978); Renner v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 373 NW2d
628, 632 (Minn. App. 1985).
97
United States v. Logan, 949 F2d
1370, 1377 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 us 925 (1992).
98
United States v. Johnson, 977 F2d
1360, 1368 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 US 1070 (1993).
99 885 F2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989).

Presumption of Regularity
In satisfying its burden of proof,
the prosecution is frequently aided
by the so-called presumption of
regularity. As one court has commented:
In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the trial judge was
entitled to assume that this official would not tamper with the
sack and can or their contents.
100 Id. at 957. See also United States
v. Scott, 19 F3d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[T]he government does not
need to prove a 'perfect' chain of custody, and any gaps in the chain go to
the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility. In this case there was at
most a minor gap in the chain of custody."); Kennedy v. State, 578 NE2d
633, 639 (Ind. 1991).
101
885 F2d at 957.
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Where no evidence indicating
otherwise is produced, the presumption of regularity supports
the official acts of public officers, and courts presume that they
have properly discharged their
official duties. 102
Several cases have extended the
presumption to hospital personnel. 103 The presumption of regularity, however, has been criticized. As
Wigmore notes, the presumption of
regularity has "more often [been]
mentioned then enforced." 104 Some
courts have also objected to its use:
The presumption of regularity, if
it can be dignified as a rule, does
not serve as a substitute for evidence when authenticity is, as
here, challenged on not insubstantial grounds. At best it may
relieve the government of the necessity for offering proof of cus102

Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d
914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). Accord United
States v. Scott, 19 F3d 1238, 1245 (7th
Cir.) ("In making this determination, the
district court makes a 'presumption of
regularity,' presuming that the government officials who had custody of the
exhibits discharged their duties properly."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 163
(1994); United States v. Kelly, 14 F3d
1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994)("When there
is no evidence of tampering, a presumption of regularity attends the official acts
of public officers in custody of evidence; the courts presume they did their
jobs correctly."); United States v. Miller,
994 F2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1993) ("officials are entitled to the presumption
of integrity").
103
Gass v. United States, 416 F2d
767, 770 (DC Cir. 1969); Pasadena Research Lab., Inc. v. United States, 169
F2d 375, 381-382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 US 853 (1948).
104
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2534,
at 488 (3d ed. 1940).

tody until the integrity of the evidence has been put in issue. 105
Another has commented that the
"Government's burden ... cannot
be diluted by unwarranted presumptions about the evidence it seeks to
introduce.'' 106 In sum, if the prosecution has met its burden of proof, the
presumption of regularity is not
needed. If the prosecution does not
meet its burden, the presumption
should not be used to save a deficiency in proof. Therefore, the presumption should be discarded as
both misleading and unnecessary.

Methods of Proof
The defense will often stipulate
to the chain of custody. 107 As with
all stipulations, however, care must
be taken in the drafting. In one case,
the stipulation failed to state that the
material seized from the defendant
was the same material tested by the
chemist, and the appellate court held
that admission was error. 108
Absent a stipulation, the chain of
custody typically is established, at
least in part, by the testimony of the
persons ("links") who had possession of the object. These witnesses
may refresh their recollections by
referring to any available documentation. 109
105

United States v. Starks, 515 F2d
112, 122 (3d Cir. 1975).
106
United States v. Lampson, 627
F2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1980).
107
E.g., People v. Perine, 402 NE2d
847, 849 (Ill. App. 1980) (chain of custody stipulated).
108
People v. Maurice, 202 NE2d,
480, 481 (Ill. 1964).
109
See Fed. R. Evict. 612 (use of writings to refresh memory); United States
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Habit Evidence

by hospital personnel in the regular
course of business. 112
These cases, however, predate the
adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Federal Rule 803(8)(B),
which governs the public records
exception specifically excludes "in
criminal cases matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel. 113 According
to the legislative history, this exclusion was based on the belief that
"observations by police officers at
the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as
reliable as observations by public
officials in other cases because of the
adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases." 114 The
scope of the police records exclusion has divided the courts. Some
courts seem to apply a per se rule,
under which all police reports are
automatically excluded, 115 while
others have adopted a more flexible
approach. For example, some courts
have held that Congress "did not
intend to exclude [police] records of
. nonadversar1a
. I rnatt ers. "116
routme,

The proponent may also introduce evidence of habit or routine
practice to establish the chain of
custody. Federal Rule 406 provides
that evidence of the routine practice
of an organization is relevant to
prove that the conduct of the organization "on a particular occasion
was in conformity with the ... routine practice." Accordingly, evidence of the standard operating procedures of police departments and
laboratories in safeguarding real
evidence may be used to establish
the chain of custody. 110

Documentary Evidence
Sometimes the chain of custody
has been established by documentary evidence. 111 For example, courts
have held that laboratory slides and
labels on specimen bottles fall
within the federal Business Records
Act because they had been prepared
v. Stevenson, 445 F2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.)
(in establishing chain of custody, officers "refreshed their recollection from
official records"); cert. denied, 404 US
857 (1971).
110
See United States v. Jones, 687
F2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir. 1982) (evidence handled by government according to "established procedures");
United States v. Luna, 585 F2d I, 6 (1st
Cir.) ("normal police procedure"), cert.
denied, 439 US 852 (1978); United
States v. Burris, 393 F2d 81, 83 (7th
Cir. 1968) (chemist testified about standard procedure of laboratory).
111 E.g., United States v. Luna, 585
F2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) (police "accou_nt_ed
for the evidence, either by official
records or by testimony concerning
normal police procedure"), cert. denied,
439 US 852 (1978); Graham v. State,
255 NE2d 652, 654 (Ind. 1970) ("police custody records" may be used to
establish chain of custody).

112

See United States v. Duhart, 496
F2d 941 944 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 US '967 (1974); Gass v. United
States, 416 F2d 7 67, 771 (DC Cir.
1969); Wheeler v. United States, 211
F2d 19, 22-23 (DC Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 US 1019 (1954).
H3 See also Mil. R. Evid. 803(6),
803(8) (specifying that "chain of custody documents" are admissible).
114 s. Rep. No. 1277, 93 Cong., 2d
Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN
7051,7064.
Hs See United States v. Ruffin, 575
F2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1978); Unit~d
States v. Oates, 560 F2d 45, 67 (2d C1r.
1977).
ll 6 United States v. Hernandez-Rojas,
617 F2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. de463
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Chain of custody records should
be considered routine nonadversarial records. The habitual use of
chain of custody documents is the
most reliable way to ensure that
there is not a break in the chain.
Their use should be encouraged. In
a civil paternity action filed by the
state, the court rejected a chain-ofcustody challenge to DNA results because a laboratory supervisor testified:
The [chain of custody] document
was developed in order to allow
the supervisor to confirm the
chain of custody without having
to bring numerous laboratory personnel to court. Dr. Harmon thoroughly discussed the document
and its safety devices. She testified in detail as to her laboratory's
procedures for drawing blood
samples and assuring proper identification of both the individuals
having the test and the blood
samples drawn from those individuals. She testified that once the
blood samples were received by
the laboratory they were checked
for any sign of tampering. 117
Another issue concerns the relationship between the public records
exception and other hearsay exceptions. Several courts have held that
documents subject to exclusion under the public records exception are
not admissible under any other hear-

say exception. 118 This interpretation
would preclude the admissibility of
chain of custody documents as business records 119 or as recorded recollection 120 if those documents are inadmissible as police records under
Rule 803(8). This view, however, is
not accepted by all courts. 121
United States v. Coleman 122 is one
of the few cases dealing with the
admissibility of chain of custody
documents under the Federal Rules.
The defendant contended that police
reports are never admissible when
offered by the prosecution, and thus
DEA forms of chemical analysis and
lock-seal envelopes containing notations of the date, time, and location of the sale of heroin and an identification of the seller by a John Doe
number were inadmissible. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the documents were not unreliable on the ground that they were
prepared for the purpose of litigation. Although the court recognized
that the forms "have certain indicia
of 'police reports,' " it found that the

118
See United States v. Oates, 560
F2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
119
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
12
°Fed. R. Evid. 803(5).
121
Several courts have found the congressional purpose of excluding police
reports under Rule 803(8) was intended
to apply only when such reports were
admitted in lieu of testimony. United
States v. King, 613 F2d 670, 673 (7th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Sawyer, 607
F2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 US 943 (1980).
122
631 F2d 908 (DC Cir. 1980).

nied, 449 US 864 (1980); United States
v. Orozco, 590 F2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 US 1049 (1979).
117 J.E.B. v. State, 606 So. 2d 156,
157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied,
1992 Ala. Lexis 1296 (Ala. Oct. 12,
1992), rev'd and remanded, J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rei. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994).
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forms and lock-sealed envelopes
contained "only skeletal information, and are prepared not solely with
an eye towards presentation, but towards preserving a record of the
chain of custody." 123
123

Chain of custody documents have
also been challenged on confrontation grounds but not succcessfully. 124
124
But see Payne v. Janasz, 711 F2d
1305, 1313-1314 (6th Cir. 1983) (admission of evidence tag bearing inscription "10001 Cedar Avenue" did not violate right of confrontation).

Id. at 912.
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